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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06010-84/1  
19 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:  25X1  
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 16 October 1984. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.  25X1

Attachment:  
NIC #06010-84

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WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CHAD

The situation in Chad remains fluid. The joint French-Libyan pullout is proceeding, albeit at a slow pace, and is likely to drag on into December.

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The Libyans are withdrawing from key strongholds but their longer term intentions remain suspect. The French appear to expect that Libya will attempt to ensure that northern dissidents remain in position with supplies once Qadhafi's troops leave.

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There is speculation that Habre could seek to modify the 1976 military agreement with France in order to gain greater assurance of French help if Qadhafi should reintervene.

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Habre can take little comfort from his position in Chad. Violence is continuing in the south amid reports and rumors of harsh retaliation by Habre's northern troops against southern dissidents. Although still squabbling among themselves and their Libyan backers, northern dissidents are likely to continue pushing their cause once the Libyans are gone. There is little reason to expect substantive movement on the part of any of the factions at preparatory reconciliation talks scheduled for Brazzaville on 20 October.

Warning Note: There is little cause for optimism over Chad. The completion of the withdrawal may well usher in a new cycle of fighting between Habre and Libyan-backed dissidents. Habre could find himself in an even more precarious position if he must cope with expanding insurgencies in both the south and the north.

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MOZAMBIQUE

Details of the agreement signed in Pretoria between FRELIMO and RENAMO are not yet available. Both sides have agreed in principle to a ceasefire but talks have been inconclusive and fighting is continuing. How far RENAMO and FRELIMO are willing and able to go remains uncertain. Both sides have staked out initial bargaining positions that will make subsequent negotiations difficult and time consuming.

There was considerable speculation among Community representatives about how the internal political dynamics of FRELIMO and RENAMO will influence any future negotiations. Discussions focused on how much leeway Machel had in negotiating, whether he could deliver and "tough out" any fallout from an agreement, and how soon and how much Machel could expect from the IMF. Questions also were raised about the cohesiveness of RENAMO's leadership and whether Machel could split the leadership by offering "carrots" to the military wing of RENAMO, the most important element of the insurgent movement.

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[redacted] suggested that South Africa probably feels under some pressure to keep the momentum gained from Nkomati going. While there was general agreement that South Africa might be able to push through a ceasefire, the direct monitoring of the ceasefire by Pretoria will be a considerably more contentious and risky task for the Botha government.

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ANGOLA

It appears that Luanda has launched an offensive of some sort in central and southeastern Angola.

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In addition to fending off the Angolan offensive, Savimbi has been moving his operations closer to Luanda and is promising to take the war to the capital as well as broaden UNITA's appeal by reaching out to ethnic groups beyond his own. There was general agreement that if, in fact, UNITA has successfully established a presence in the mountains of northwestern Angola and can hang on there it would represent a significant strengthening of its position and that it would be difficult for Angolan forces to dislodge them.

#### FOOD CRISIS

The NSC representative noted growing policy interest in the food crisis, focusing most heavily at present on the situation in Ethiopia. The Community should be alert to the political impact of what appears to be a growing food crisis throughout the continent, as well as the ability of African governments to effectively absorb and distribute food assistance. It was noted that Nigerien President Kountche--scheduled to meet with the President in early December--took power in 1974 in part because the sitting government was unable to respond to drought conditions and food shortages.

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